The State Administration for Market Regulation's "Regulations on Prohibiting the Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights to Exclude or Restrict Competition" will take effect on August 1.

Article 1 In order to prevent and stop the abuse of intellectual property rights to exclude or restrict competition, these regulations are formulated in accordance with the Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the Anti-Monopoly Law).

Article 2 Anti-monopoly and intellectual property protection share common goals, namely promoting competition and innovation, improving economic operation efficiency, and safeguarding consumer interests and social public interests.

Operators shall exercise intellectual property rights in accordance with relevant laws and administrative regulations on intellectual property, but shall not abuse intellectual property rights to exclude or restrict competition.

Article 3 The abuse of intellectual property rights to exclude or restrict competition referred to in these regulations means operators exercising intellectual property rights in violation of the Anti-Monopoly Law, concluding monopoly agreements, abusing market dominance, or implementing monopoly behaviors such as operator concentration that have or may have the effect of excluding or restricting competition.

Article 4 The State Administration for Market Regulation (hereinafter referred to as the Market Regulation Administration) is responsible for the unified antitrust enforcement against the abuse of intellectual property rights to exclude or restrict competition in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 13 of the Anti-Monopoly Law.

The Market Regulation Administration authorizes the market supervision and administration departments of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government (hereinafter referred to as provincial-level market regulation departments) to be responsible for antitrust enforcement against monopoly agreements, abuse of market dominance, and other abuses of intellectual property rights to exclude or restrict competition within their administrative regions according to the second paragraph of Article 13 of the Anti-Monopoly Law.

The antitrust enforcement agencies referred to in these regulations include the Market Regulation Administration and provincial-level market regulation departments.

Article 5 The relevant market referred to in these regulations includes the relevant product market and the relevant geographic market, which are defined according to the Anti-Monopoly Law and the "Guidelines on the Definition of Relevant Markets" issued by the Anti-Monopoly Committee of the State Council, taking into account factors such as intellectual property and innovation. In antitrust enforcement involving intellectual property licensing and other matters, the relevant product market may be a technology market or a product market containing specific intellectual property. The relevant technology market refers to the market formed by competition among technologies involved in exercising intellectual property rights and substitutable similar technologies.

Article 6 Operators shall not use the exercise of intellectual property rights to reach monopoly agreements prohibited by Articles 17 and the first paragraph of Article 18 of the Anti-Monopoly Law.

Operators shall not use the exercise of intellectual property rights to organize other operators to reach monopoly agreements or provide substantial assistance for other operators to reach monopoly agreements.

If operators can prove that the agreements reached fall under the circumstances stipulated in Article 20 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, the provisions of the first and second paragraphs shall not apply.

Article 7 Operators using the exercise of intellectual property rights to reach agreements with trading counterparts as stipulated in the first paragraph, items one and two of Article 18 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, and can prove that such agreements do not have the effect of excluding or restricting competition, shall not be prohibited.

Operators using the exercise of intellectual property rights to reach agreements with trading counterparts, and can prove that the participating operators in the relevant market have a market share below the standards set by the Market Regulation Administration and meet other conditions prescribed by the Market Regulation Administration, shall not be prohibited. Specific standards can refer to the relevant provisions of the "Anti-Monopoly Guidelines in the Field of Intellectual Property" issued by the Anti-Monopoly Committee of the State Council.

Article 8 Operators with market dominance shall not abuse their market dominance in the process of exercising intellectual property rights to exclude or restrict competition.

Market dominance is identified and presumed according to the Anti-Monopoly Law and the "Regulations on Prohibiting Abuse of Market Dominance." The fact that an operator owns intellectual property rights can be one of the factors for identifying market dominance, but market dominance in the relevant market cannot be presumed solely based on ownership of intellectual property rights.

In determining whether an operator owning intellectual property rights has dominance in the relevant market, factors such as the possibility and cost for trading counterparts in the relevant market to switch to substitutable technologies or products, the dependence of downstream markets on goods provided through intellectual property rights, and the countervailing power of trading counterparts against the operator may also be considered.

Article 9 Operators with market dominance shall not, in the process of exercising intellectual property rights, license intellectual property or sell products containing intellectual property at unfairly high prices to exclude or restrict competition.

The following factors may be considered in identifying the behavior described in the preceding paragraph:

(1) The research and development cost and recovery period of the intellectual property;

(2) The method of calculating licensing fees and licensing conditions for the intellectual property;

(3) Historical licensing fees or licensing fee standards comparable to the intellectual property;

(4) Commitments made by the operator regarding the licensing of the intellectual property;

(5) Other relevant factors that need to be considered.

Article 10 Operators with market dominance shall not, without justified reasons, refuse to license other operators to use the intellectual property on reasonable terms in the process of exercising intellectual property rights, thereby excluding or restricting competition.

The following factors shall be considered simultaneously in identifying the behavior described in the preceding paragraph:

(1) The intellectual property cannot be reasonably substituted in the relevant market and is necessary for other operators to participate in competition in the relevant market;

(2) Refusal to license the intellectual property will adversely affect competition or innovation in the relevant market, harming consumer interests or social public interests;

(3) Licensing the intellectual property will not cause unreasonable harm to the operator.

Article 11 Operators with market dominance shall not, without justified reasons, engage in the following exclusive dealing practices in the process of exercising intellectual property rights to exclude or restrict competition:

(1) Restricting trading counterparts to only trade with them;

(2) Restricting trading counterparts to only trade with operators designated by them;

(3) Restrict trading counterparties from transacting with specific operators.

Article 12 Operators with market dominance shall not, without justified reasons, engage in the following tying sales behaviors during the exercise of intellectual property rights, violating industry or field trading practices, consumer habits, or ignoring the function of goods, thereby excluding or restricting competition:

(1) Forcing or indirectly forcing the licensee to purchase other unnecessary products when licensing intellectual property rights;

(2) Forcing or indirectly forcing the licensee to accept a package license when licensing intellectual property rights.

Article 13 Operators with market dominance shall not, without justified reasons, impose the following unreasonable trading conditions during the exercise of intellectual property rights, excluding or restricting competition:

(1) Requiring the trading counterparty to exclusively or solely license back improved technology, or requiring cross-licensing in the same technical field without providing reasonable compensation;

(2) Prohibiting the trading counterparty from questioning the validity of their intellectual property rights;

(3) Restricting the trading counterparty from using competitive technology or products after the license agreement expires without infringing intellectual property rights;

(4) Imposing other unreasonable trading conditions on the trading counterparty.

Article 14 Operators with market dominance shall not, without justified reasons, discriminate against trading counterparties under the same conditions during the exercise of intellectual property rights, excluding or restricting competition.

Article 15 Operators involved in intellectual property concentration that meet the declaration standards set by the State Council shall declare in advance to the State Administration for Market Regulation. Concentration shall not be implemented without declaration or before approval is obtained after declaration.

Article 16 Review of intellectual property-related operator concentration shall consider the factors stipulated in Article 33 of the Anti-Monopoly Law and the characteristics of intellectual property.

Depending on the specific circumstances of the intellectual property-related operator concentration transaction, additional restrictive conditions may include the following:

(1) Divestiture of intellectual property or the business involving the intellectual property;

(2) Maintaining independent operation of the intellectual property-related business;

(3) Licensing intellectual property under reasonable conditions;

(4) Other restrictive conditions.

Article 17 Operators shall not, during the exercise of intellectual property rights, use patent pools to engage in behaviors that exclude or restrict competition.

Members of patent pools shall not exchange sensitive competitive information such as prices, output, or market division, nor reach monopoly agreements prohibited by Articles 17 and 18, Paragraph 1 of the Anti-Monopoly Law. However, operators can prove that the agreements reached comply with the exceptions stipulated in Articles 18 Paragraphs 2 and 3 and Article 20 of the Anti-Monopoly Law.

Entities with market dominance in patent pools or members of patent pools shall not abuse their market dominance through patent pools by engaging in the following behaviors:

(1) Licensing pool patents at unfairly high prices;

(2) Without justified reasons, restricting the scope of patent use by pool members or licensees;

(3) Without justified reasons, restricting pool members from licensing patents independently outside the pool;

(4) Without justified reasons, restricting pool members or licensees from independently or jointly developing technologies competing with pool patents with third parties;

(5) Without justified reasons, forcing licensees to exclusively or solely license back improved or developed technologies to the patent pool entity or members;

(6) Without justified reasons, prohibiting licensees from challenging the validity of pool patents;

(7) Without justified reasons, forcing combined licensing of competitive patents, or forcing combined licensing of unnecessary patents or expired patents with other patents;

(8) Without justified reasons, discriminating in transaction conditions against pool members or licensees in the same relevant market under the same conditions;

(9) Other acts of abusing market dominance as identified by the State Administration for Market Regulation.

The term "patent pool" in these regulations refers to two or more operators jointly licensing their patents to pool members or third parties. Patent pool parties usually entrust pool members or independent third parties to manage the pool. Specific forms of pooling include agreements, establishing companies, or other entities.

Article 18 Operators shall not, without justified reasons, use the formulation and implementation of standards to reach the following monopoly agreements during the exercise of intellectual property rights:

(1) Jointly excluding specific operators from participating in standard formulation with competitors, or excluding specific operators' related standard technical solutions;

(2) Jointly excluding other specific operators from implementing related standards with competitors;

(3) Agreeing with competitors not to implement other competitive standards;

(4) Other monopoly agreements identified by the State Administration for Market Regulation.

Article 19 Operators with market dominance shall not engage in the following behaviors during the formulation and implementation of standards, excluding or restricting competition:

(1) Failing to timely and fully disclose their rights information according to the standard-setting organization's regulations during participation in standard formulation, or explicitly waiving their rights, but later asserting patent rights against standard implementers after the standard involves the patent;

(2) After their patent becomes a standard essential patent, violating the principles of fairness, reasonableness, and non-discrimination by licensing at unfairly high prices, unjustifiably refusing to license, tying sales of goods, imposing other unreasonable trading conditions, or implementing discriminatory treatment;

(3) In the process of licensing standard essential patents, violating the principles of fairness, reasonableness, and non-discrimination, and without good faith negotiation, requesting the court or other relevant departments to issue judgments, rulings, or decisions prohibiting the use of related intellectual property rights, thereby forcing the licensee to accept unfairly high prices or other unreasonable transaction conditions;

(4) Other acts of abuse of market dominance recognized by the State Administration for Market Regulation. The standard essential patents referred to in these provisions are patents indispensable for implementing the relevant standard.

Article 20 When determining the "justifiable reasons" referred to in Articles 10 to 14 and Articles 17 to 19 of these provisions, the following factors may be considered:

(1) Beneficial to encouraging innovation and promoting fair market competition;

(2) Necessary for exercising or protecting intellectual property rights;

(3) Necessary to meet product safety, technical effects, product performance, etc.;

(4) Actual needs of the transaction counterpart and in line with legitimate industry practices and trading customs;

(5) Other factors that can prove the legitimacy of the behavior.

Article 21 Operators shall not engage in monopolistic behaviors prohibited by the Anti-Monopoly Law and these provisions when exercising copyright and related rights.

Article 22 The following steps may be taken to analyze and determine whether an operator abuses intellectual property rights to exclude or restrict competition:

(1) Determine the nature and form of the operator's exercise of intellectual property rights;

(2) Determine the nature of the relationship between operators exercising intellectual property rights;

(3) Define the relevant market involved in the exercise of intellectual property rights;

(4) Determine the market position of the operator exercising intellectual property rights;

(5) Analyze the impact of the operator's exercise of intellectual property rights on competition in the relevant market.

Determining the nature of the relationship between operators requires considering the characteristics of the exercise of intellectual property rights itself. In cases involving intellectual property licensing, operators originally in competition have a transactional relationship in the licensing agreement, but in the market where both licensor and licensee use the intellectual property to produce products, they are competitors. However, if there was no competitive relationship when the licensing agreement was concluded and competition arises only after the agreement, it is still not considered an agreement between competitors unless the original agreement undergoes substantial changes.

Article 23 When analyzing and determining the impact of an operator's exercise of intellectual property rights on competition in the relevant market, the following factors should be considered:

(1) The market position of the operator and the transaction counterpart;

(2) The market concentration of the relevant market;

(3) The ease or difficulty of entering the relevant market;

(4) Industry practices and the stage of industry development;

(5) The duration and scope of restrictions on output, regions, consumers, etc.;

(6) The impact on promoting innovation and technology dissemination;

(7) The operator's innovation capability and the speed of technological change;

(8) Other factors related to determining the impact of the exercise of intellectual property rights on competition in the relevant market.

Article 24 When investigating and punishing abuse of intellectual property rights to exclude or restrict competition, anti-monopoly enforcement agencies shall follow the procedures stipulated in the Anti-Monopoly Law, the "Provisions on Prohibiting Monopoly Agreements," the "Provisions on Prohibiting Abuse of Market Dominance," and the "Provisions on Review of Concentrations of Undertakings."

Article 25 Operators who violate the Anti-Monopoly Law and these provisions by reaching and implementing monopoly agreements shall be ordered by the anti-monopoly enforcement agencies to stop the illegal acts, confiscate illegal gains, and be fined between 1% and 10% of the previous year's sales revenue; if there was no sales revenue in the previous year, a fine of up to 5 million yuan shall be imposed; if the monopoly agreement has not yet been implemented, a fine of up to 3 million yuan may be imposed. The legal representatives, main responsible persons, and directly responsible personnel of the operators who bear personal responsibility for reaching monopoly agreements may be fined up to 1 million yuan.

Operators who organize other operators to reach monopoly agreements or provide substantial assistance for other operators to reach monopoly agreements shall be subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraph.

Article 26 Operators who violate the Anti-Monopoly Law and these provisions by abusing market dominance shall be ordered by the anti-monopoly enforcement agencies to stop the illegal acts, confiscate illegal gains, and be fined between 1% and 10% of the previous year's sales revenue.

Article 27 Operators who illegally implement concentrations involving intellectual property rights and have or may have the effect of excluding or restricting competition shall be ordered by the State Administration for Market Regulation to stop the concentration, dispose of shares or assets within a time limit, transfer business within a time limit, and take other necessary measures to restore the pre-concentration state, and be fined up to 10% of the previous year's sales revenue; if there is no effect of excluding or restricting competition, a fine of up to 5 million yuan shall be imposed.

Article 28 When determining the specific amount of fines for violations of Articles 25, 26, and 27 of these provisions, anti-monopoly enforcement agencies shall consider factors such as the nature, degree, duration of the illegal acts, and the situation of eliminating the consequences of the illegal acts.

Article 29 For violations of the Anti-Monopoly Law that are particularly serious in circumstances, have particularly adverse effects, or cause particularly serious consequences, the State Administration for Market Regulation may determine the specific amount of fines at no less than twice and no more than five times the amounts stipulated in Articles 56, 57, 58, and 62 of the Anti-Monopoly Law.

Article 30 If anti-monopoly enforcement agency staff abuse their power, neglect their duties, engage in favoritism or fraud, or disclose business secrets, personal privacy, and personal information learned during law enforcement, they shall be dealt with in accordance with relevant regulations.

Article 31 If anti-monopoly enforcement agencies discover clues of public officials suspected of duty-related violations or crimes during investigations, they shall promptly transfer them to disciplinary inspection and supervision authorities.

Article 32   If this regulation does not provide provisions on abuse of intellectual property rights to exclude or restrict competition, it shall be handled in accordance with the Anti-Monopoly Law and the "Provisions on Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements", "Provisions on Prohibition of Abuse of Market Dominance", and "Provisions on Review of Concentration of Operators".

Article 33   This regulation shall come into effect on August 1, 2023. The "Provisions on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights to Exclude or Restrict Competition" promulgated by the former State Administration for Industry and Commerce on April 7, 2015, Order No. 74, shall be repealed simultaneously.

Appendix:

Interpretation of the "Provisions on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights to Exclude or Restrict Competition"

To implement the amended "Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China" (hereinafter referred to as the new "Anti-Monopoly Law"), strengthen and improve antitrust enforcement in the field of intellectual property rights, and effectively prevent and stop abuse of intellectual property rights to exclude or restrict competition, the State Administration for Market Regulation has revised the "Provisions on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights to Exclude or Restrict Competition" (Order No. 31 of the State Administration for Market Regulation, hereinafter referred to as the original "Provisions"). To better implement the newly revised "Provisions on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights to Exclude or Restrict Competition" (Order No. 79 of the State Administration for Market Regulation, hereinafter referred to as the "Provisions"), the following interpretation is provided:

I. Necessity of the Revision

Since the original "Provisions" were promulgated and implemented, they have provided a basis for antitrust enforcement in the field of intellectual property rights and achieved good implementation results, playing a positive role in protecting intellectual property rights and promoting fair market competition. To implement the major decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee and the State Council on strengthening antitrust, deeply advancing the implementation of fair competition policies, and implementing the intellectual property power strategy, and to implement the spirit of the new "Anti-Monopoly Law", it is necessary to revise the original "Provisions" to improve and perfect the antitrust system and rules in the field of intellectual property rights, enhancing the scientific, targeted, and effective nature of the system.

(1) The urgent need to improve the antitrust system and rules and maintain fair market competition in the field of intellectual property rights. Based on summarizing regulatory enforcement experience, focusing on grasping the laws and characteristics of industrial development, accelerating the improvement of China's antitrust system in the field of intellectual property rights is conducive to enhancing the systematicness, scientific nature, and effectiveness of China's antitrust system and rules, better responding to the adverse effects of monopoly behaviors in the field of intellectual property rights on China's industrial development, and maintaining a fair competitive market order.

(2) The urgent need to accelerate the construction of a unified national market and promote innovative economic development in China. Improving and perfecting the antitrust system and rules in the field of intellectual property rights is conducive to providing clear and explicit behavioral guidance for a wide range of market entities, enhancing the stability and transparency of antitrust regulation, providing high-quality institutional supply and legal guarantees for building a unified national market; it is conducive to better protecting intellectual property rights, protecting and promoting fair market competition, fully playing the fundamental role of the market in allocating innovation factor resources, and improving economic operation efficiency.

(3) The urgent need to better serve high-level opening-up and enhance the international competitiveness of China's industries. Intellectual property rights are strategic resources for national development and core elements of international competitiveness. Entering a new development stage, based on the development stage, characteristics, and practical needs of China's industries participating in international competition, improving and perfecting the antitrust system and rules in the field of intellectual property rights is conducive to better participating in international competition governance; it is conducive to combating monopoly behaviors in the field of intellectual property rights, supporting Chinese enterprises to deeply participate in international competition, and promoting the construction of new international competitive advantages.

II. Revision Process

The State Administration for Market Regulation fully implements the requirements of scientific legislation, democratic legislation, law-based legislation, and open legislation, focusing on improving legislative quality, and steadily advancing the revision work.

(1) Conducting in-depth theoretical research. Commissioning experts from the expert advisory group of the State Council Anti-Monopoly Committee to carry out legislative consultation projects for the revision of the "Provisions" and strengthening legislative research. Adhering to China's national conditions and the phased characteristics of economic development, through case studies, comparative studies, and empirical research methods, fully absorbing and drawing on mature domestic and foreign experiences to lay a solid theoretical foundation for the revision work.

(2) Systematically summarizing practical issues. Focusing on key areas such as wireless communications, organizing multiple industry and enterprise symposiums, conducting research visits to relevant enterprises and departments, and carrying out in-depth investigations. Focusing on key issues involved in the "Provisions" such as unfair high prices, patent pooling, and standard essential patents, deeply summarizing practical experience, proposing regulatory ideas and measures, and laying a solid practical foundation for the revision work.

(3) Widely soliciting opinions and suggestions. During the revision process, widely soliciting opinions and suggestions from provincial market regulatory departments, social organizations, research institutions, and experts and scholars. After forming the draft revision, from June 27 to July 27, 2022, soliciting public opinions through the China Government Legal Information Network and the official website of the State Administration for Market Regulation, and soliciting opinions from relevant departments such as member units of the State Council Anti-Monopoly Committee. From November 2022 to March 2023, three legislative symposiums and seminars were held successively to further listen to opinions and suggestions from relevant departments, experts, and scholars, fully absorbing various opinions and consolidating consensus to ensure the "Provisions" are more reasonable, scientific, and complete.

III. Revision Approach

The revision work adheres to Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era as guidance, fully studies and implements the spirit of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, focuses on strengthening intellectual property protection, enhancing antitrust, and deeply advancing the implementation of fair competition policies, striving to improve the antitrust system and rules, and enhance antitrust regulation in the field of intellectual property rights, mainly following the following revision approaches:

(1) Fully implement the system and spirit of the new "Anti-Monopoly Law." Deeply understand and grasp the legislative spirit of "encouraging innovation" and the latest system requirements of the new law, not only implementing general systems and coordinating with supporting regulations such as the "Provisions on Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements," but also refining and improving special antitrust rules in the field of intellectual property rights according to their characteristics and laws, enhancing the applicability, targeting, and operability of the system.

(2) Adhere to the institutional concept of "balancing protection and antitrust." Focus on better balancing the protection of intellectual property rights and antitrust, promoting innovation and fair competition, correctly handling the relationship between efficiency and fairness, vitality and order, present and future, highlighting that protecting intellectual property rights is an inherent part of fair competition, improving and perfecting the antitrust system and rules in the field of intellectual property rights, and providing fair, transparent, and predictable behavioral guidance for a wide range of market entities.

(3) Strengthen the regulation and guidance of market competition behaviors. Adapt to the phased characteristics and development trends of China's industries, actively respond to prominent issues in market competition in the field of intellectual property rights, formulate targeted regulatory measures, regulate and guide business models and competitive behaviors toward a fairer and more reasonable direction, and promote fair market competition and industrial innovation development.

IV. Main Contents of the Revision

The current "Provisions" consist of 19 articles. This revision retains 1 article, modifies 18 articles, and adds 14 articles, totaling 33 articles after revision. The main modifications include:

(1) Fully implement the institutional requirements of the new "Anti-Monopoly Law." First, implement the legislative purpose of encouraging innovation in the new "Anti-Monopoly Law," incorporating additional factors for determining market dominance in conjunction with the "Guidelines on Anti-Monopoly in the Field of Intellectual Property" issued by the State Council Anti-Monopoly Committee (hereinafter referred to as the "Guidelines") (Article 8); add considerations for operators exercising intellectual property rights with justifiable reasons (Article 20). Second, improve the types of monopoly agreements in the field of intellectual property, adding provisions that "operators shall not use the exercise of intellectual property rights to organize other operators to reach monopoly agreements or provide substantial assistance for other operators to reach monopoly agreements" (Article 6). Amend the safe harbor rules and ensure coordination with the "Guidelines" (Article 7). Third, adjust legal liability provisions in accordance with the new "Anti-Monopoly Law," clarifying the handling of illegal conduct by anti-monopoly enforcement agency staff and the procedural connection for clues regarding public officials suspected of duty-related violations or crimes (Articles 25 to 31).

(2) Improve the anti-monopoly institutional system in the field of intellectual property. First, add provisions regarding unfairly high prices (Article 9). Refine the rules for identifying other abuses of market dominance (Articles 10 to 14) and considerations for justifiable reasons (Article 20). Second, add provisions related to concentration of operators in the intellectual property field, clarifying the declaration requirements for operator concentration involving intellectual property (Article 15), and stipulating specific circumstances for considerations during review and additional restrictive conditions (Article 16). Third, clarify the relationship with general rules such as the "Anti-Monopoly Law," "Provisions on Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements," "Provisions on Prohibition of Abuse of Market Dominance," and "Provisions on Review of Concentration of Operators," adding clauses on procedural and rule applicability (Articles 24 and 32).

(3) Improve anti-monopoly rules in key areas such as standard essential patents. First, amend and improve specific provisions on monopoly agreements and abuse of market dominance related to patent pooling (Article 17). Second, clarify monopoly agreement situations in standard setting and implementation, and improve provisions on abuse of market dominance in licensing of standard essential patents (Articles 18 and 19). Specifically, in response to strong concerns in the field of standard essential patents about rights holders abusing the right to sue for injunction remedies, a special regulatory clause has been added, clarifying specific application requirements (Article 19, Paragraph 1, Item 3). Third, add anti-monopoly provisions related to copyrights and related rights (Article 21).

5. Main Features

The "Provisions" mainly have the following three characteristics:

(1) Balancing the strengthening of anti-monopoly supervision and the protection of intellectual property. Intellectual property and anti-monopoly systems share the common goal of protecting fair competition and promoting innovative development. However, intellectual property should be exercised within the legal and reasonable scope; once it exceeds reasonable limits, it will harm market fair competition and innovation. The "Provisions" fully embody the institutional concept of "balancing protection and anti-monopoly," by clarifying the boundaries between private rights and public interest protection, as well as industry and competition supervision, imposing just and effective constraints on the exercise of intellectual property rights to prevent and stop the abuse of intellectual property to exclude or restrict competition, thereby promoting the orderly flow and efficient allocation of market resources and innovation elements.

(2) Balancing the maintenance of fair competition and the promotion of innovative development. The ultimate goal of protecting market fair competition is to promote innovative development. Strengthening anti-monopoly supervision and enforcement in the field of intellectual property requires properly handling the relationship between development and regulation, efficiency and fairness, vitality and order. The "Provisions" focus on enhancing the stability, relevance, and foresight of the anti-monopoly system in the intellectual property field, providing more specific and comprehensive rule bases for anti-monopoly supervision and enforcement, effectively guiding and regulating market competition behaviors in the intellectual property field, maintaining fair competition market order, and creating a market environment conducive to innovative development.

(3) Balancing the development interests of intellectual property rights holders and implementers. Both intellectual property rights holders and implementers are key drivers of innovative development. Strengthening anti-monopoly supervision and enforcement in the intellectual property field requires balancing the development interests of both rights holders and implementers, helping rights holders realize their legitimate rights and interests while also promoting implementers to achieve development goals and obtain reasonable returns. In the design of institutional rules, the "Provisions" adhere to balancing current and long-term interests, coordinating and balancing the interests between rights holders and implementers, striving to provide institutional guarantees for various business entities to participate fairly in market competition, and fully stimulating the innovation vitality and motivation of intellectual property rights holders and implementers.