National Development and Reform Commission: Improve Government Integrity Performance Mechanism and Optimize the Development Environment for the Private Economy

Notice of the National Development and Reform Commission on Improving the Government Integrity Performance Mechanism and Optimizing the Development Environment for the Private Economy

Development and Reform Finance [2023] No. 1103

　　Leading Departments for Social Credit System Construction in All Provinces, Autonomous Regions, Municipalities Directly under the Central Government, and Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps:

　　To thoroughly implement the relevant requirements of the "Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on Promoting the Development and Growth of the Private Economy" regarding "improving the government integrity performance mechanism and establishing and improving the record and punishment system for government dishonesty," to advance government integrity construction, and to create a favorable environment for the development of the private economy, the following work is hereby notified.

　　 I. Fully Recognize the Importance of Improving the Government Integrity Performance Mechanism

　　Government integrity is an important part of the social credit system. The government plays a leading role in credit construction, directly affecting the government's image and credibility. Guided by Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, and fully implementing the spirit of the 20th National Congress of the CPC, efforts should be made to strengthen the construction of the government integrity performance mechanism, focus on solving administrative dishonesty such as frequent policy changes, new officials ignoring previous commitments, damaging fair market transactions, and harming enterprise interests, promote the optimization of the business environment, enhance private enterprises' investment confidence, and promote the development and growth of the private economy.

　 　II. Establish a Mechanism for the Source Acquisition and Identification of Breach of Contract and Dishonesty Information

　　(1) Smooth complaint channels for breach of contract and dishonesty. Provincial-level leading departments for social credit system construction (hereinafter referred to as "credit leading departments") should rely on their credit websites, the State Council's "Internet + Supervision" platform, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology's "Registration (Complaint) Platform for Breach of Contract and Arrears to SMEs," local 12345 government service hotlines, business environment complaint platforms, petition departments, and other channels to establish or improve special columns for breach of contract and dishonesty complaints, accepting and collecting complaints involving government departments (including agencies and public institutions) within their jurisdiction. The scope of breach of contract and dishonesty includes breach and repudiation behaviors in various agreements and contracts signed by government departments with private enterprises in government procurement, bidding, investment promotion, government-social capital cooperation, industrial support, government investment, and other fields. Our commission will publicize local complaint columns on the "Credit China" website and promptly coordinate the handling of complaints received by various regions. Support localities in exploring the establishment of contract performance credit supervision columns based on their credit information sharing platforms and credit websites, collecting relevant agreements and contracts signed by government departments with private enterprises within their jurisdiction, and regularly tracking performance.

　　(2) Strengthen the identification of breach of contract and dishonesty behaviors. Provincial-level credit leading departments should immediately transfer received and collected breach of contract and dishonesty complaint clues to the superior or competent departments of the complained entities for verification and identification. If verified as untrue, the identifying department should promptly provide feedback and explanations to the complainant; if verified as true, the identifying department should immediately promote rectification. Those who refuse to rectify shall be confirmed as breach of contract and dishonesty by the identifying department. Failure to perform due to institutional adjustments, personnel changes, and other reasons shall all be regarded as breach of contract and dishonesty.

　　III. Improve the Dishonesty Punishment and Credit Restoration Mechanism

　　(3) Fully improve government credit records. The National Public Credit Information Center should expedite the formulation of relevant information collection standards. Provincial-level credit leading departments should increase efforts to collect government credit information and share identified breach of contract and dishonesty information in real time to the national credit information sharing platform according to unified standards. Our commission will uniformly include breach of contract and dishonesty information, arrears information sorted by localities as required, and information on those listed as dishonest persons subject to enforcement under the relevant entities to form government credit records. Credit leading departments at all levels should promote the inclusion of dishonesty records into performance evaluation indicators of relevant government departments. Our commission will appropriately include government dishonesty records in business environment evaluations and comprehensive performance evaluations of high-quality development.

　　(4) Make full use of the "toolbox" of dishonesty punishment measures in the development and reform system. For relevant entities with dishonesty records, our commission will restrict support from central budget funds, limit applications for local government special bonds, and restrict recommendations for various financing projects according to regulations; for prefecture-level and above cities with government dishonesty records, our commission will cancel their eligibility for awards and pilot demonstrations in the development and reform system, increase the weight of city credit monitoring deductions, and cancel the title or eligibility for demonstration zones of social credit system construction.

　　(5) Urge localities to establish dishonesty punishment systems. Credit leading departments at all levels should refer to the establishment of government dishonesty punishment mechanisms and promote government departments at the same level to actively mobilize various dishonesty punishment measures within their functional scope, including but not limited to restricting government funding support, limiting applications for support policies, canceling awards, and restricting participation in government procurement, to ensure that dishonesty is punished.

　　(6) Improve the credit restoration mechanism. Credit leading departments at all levels should coordinate and guide credit restoration work for dishonest entities within their jurisdiction. Once the identifying department confirms that the dishonest behavior has been corrected and performance completed, relevant dishonesty records should be promptly restored, and dishonesty punishment measures terminated.

　　IV. Strengthen Policy Guarantees for Work Implementation

　　(7) Conduct regular evaluation and notification. Our commission will evaluate key tasks such as the handling and identification efficiency of breach of contract and dishonesty complaints, the quality of credit information collection, and the implementation of dishonesty punishment measures through spot checks, third-party investigations, cross-checks, and other methods, regularly notifying provincial credit leading departments and copying the provincial people's governments. Credit leading departments at all levels should refer to the establishment of evaluation and notification mechanisms.

　　(8) Establish a monitoring, discovery, and supervision mechanism for dishonesty clues. Our commission will increase efforts to monitor and discover government dishonesty clues through communication mechanisms with private enterprises, big data monitoring, and selecting representative private enterprises to establish monitoring points, transferring clues immediately to the place of jurisdiction for supervision and continuous follow-up. Credit leading departments at all levels should refer to the establishment of corresponding mechanisms and promptly discover and handle dishonesty behaviors through multiple channels.

　　(9) Expose a batch of typical cases. Select a batch of cases with serious dishonesty, repeated dishonesty, and strong public complaints, publicize them on the "Credit China" website, and expose them to society through news media to form a strong public opinion deterrent.

National Development and Reform Commission

August 5, 2023