Major Accident Hazard Determination Standards — Chemical Industry and Hazardous Chemicals (with Interpretation)

According to relevant laws, regulations, departmental rules, and national standards, the following situations shall be determined as major accident hazards:

1. The principal person in charge and safety production management personnel of hazardous chemical production and operation units have not passed the legal assessment.

2. Special operation personnel are not certified to work.

3. The external safety protection distance of production devices and storage facilities involving "two key points and one major" does not meet national standard requirements.

4. Devices involving key regulated hazardous chemical processes have not achieved automated control; the system does not have an emergency shutdown function; the automated control system and emergency shutdown system equipment have not been put into use.

5. Hazardous chemical tank areas constituting first-level and second-level major hazard sources have not implemented emergency cut-off functions; tank areas involving toxic gases, liquefied gases, and highly toxic liquids as first-level and second-level major hazard sources are not equipped with independent safety instrumented systems.

6. Full-pressure liquefied hydrocarbon storage tanks have not set up water injection measures according to national standards.

7. The filling of flammable, explosive, toxic, and harmful liquefied gases such as liquefied hydrocarbons, liquid ammonia, and liquid chlorine does not use a universal pipeline filling system.

8. Pipelines of highly toxic gases such as phosgene and chlorine, and hydrogen sulfide gas pipelines pass through public areas outside the plant area (including chemical parks and industrial parks).

9. Regional overhead power lines pass through production areas and do not meet national standard requirements.

10. In-service chemical devices have not undergone formal design and safety design diagnosis.

11. Use of processes and equipment listed in the catalog of eliminated outdated safety technologies and equipment.

12. Places involving combustible and toxic harmful gas leaks have not set detection and alarm devices according to national standards; explosion hazard areas have not installed and used explosion-proof electrical equipment according to national standards.

13. Control rooms or cabinet rooms facing devices with fire and explosion hazards do not meet national standards for fire and explosion prevention.

14. Chemical production devices have not set dual power supply according to national standards; automated control systems have not set uninterruptible power supplies.

15. Safety accessories such as safety valves and rupture discs have not been properly put into use.

16. A comprehensive safety production responsibility system matching the positions has not been established, or the production safety accident hazard investigation and management system has not been formulated and implemented.

17. Operating procedures and process control indicators have not been formulated.

18. Special operation management systems such as hot work and confined space entry have not been formulated according to national standards, or the systems have not been effectively implemented.

19. Newly developed hazardous chemical production processes have directly proceeded to industrial production without pilot, pilot-scale, and industrial tests; chemical processes used for the first time domestically have not undergone safety and reliability demonstration organized by relevant provincial government departments; new devices have not formulated trial production plans for feeding and start-up; fine chemical enterprises have not conducted reaction safety risk assessments according to normative documents.

20. Hazardous chemicals have not been stored in classified and zoned manners according to national standards; hazardous chemicals are stored in excess quantity or variety; incompatible substances are mixed and stored together.

The "Work Safety Law", "Regulations on the Safety Management of Hazardous Chemicals", and "Safety Training Regulations for Production and Operation Units" (Order No. 3 of the State Administration of Work Safety) all clearly require training and assessment of employees in hazardous chemical production and operation units. Among them, Article 24 of the "Work Safety Law" requires "The principal persons in charge and safety production management personnel of production and operation units must possess safety production knowledge and management capabilities corresponding to the production and operation activities of their units. The principal persons in charge and safety production management personnel of units producing, operating, and storing hazardous materials, as well as mines, metal smelting, construction, and road transportation units, shall be assessed and qualified by the department responsible for safety production supervision and management. The assessment shall be free of charge." The "Safety Training Regulations for Production and Operation Units" clearly require "The principal persons in charge and safety production management personnel of hazardous chemical production and operation units must pass the safety production knowledge and management capability assessment conducted by the safety production supervision and inspection department within 6 months from the date of taking office." On January 25, 2017, the State Administration of Work Safety issued the "Key Assessment Content of Safety Production Management Knowledge for Principal Persons in Charge of Chemical (Hazardous Chemicals) Enterprises (First Edition)" and the "Key Assessment Content of Safety Production Management Knowledge for Safety Production Management Personnel of Chemical (Hazardous Chemicals) Enterprises (First Edition)". (Announcement No. 15 of the General Office of the State Administration of Work Safety [2017]) Regarding the key assessment content for principal persons in charge and safety management personnel of relevant enterprises, clear requirements were put forward, and departments responsible for safety production supervision and management shall assess relevant enterprise personnel in accordance with relevant laws and regulations.

Special operation posts have relatively high safety risks and require high professional competence of personnel. In recent years, accidents caused by personnel in special operation posts who were untrained and unqualified have occurred frequently, such as the "5·13" chlorine poisoning accident in Cangzhou, Hebei in 2017, the major explosion accident in Linyi, Shandong on "6·5", and the explosion accident in Jiujiang, Jiangxi on "7·2". These incidents exposed problems of unlicensed personnel working in special operation posts and insufficient professional competence leading to accidents.

The "Work Safety Law" and the "Regulations on Safety Technical Training and Assessment Management for Special Operations Personnel" (Order No. 30 of the State Administration of Work Safety) both put forward clear requirements for the training and corresponding qualifications of special operations personnel, such as hazardous chemical special operations personnel should have a high school education or equivalent or above. According to regulations, special operations involved in chemical and hazardous chemical production and operation units, besides common types such as electrical work, welding and thermal cutting, and high-altitude operations, also include hazardous chemical process operations and installation, maintenance, and servicing of chemical automation control instruments (including 15 hazardous processes such as phosgene and phosgene chemical processes, chlor-alkali electrolysis process, chlorination process, nitration process, synthetic ammonia process, cracking [cracking] process, fluorination process, hydrogenation process, diazotization process, oxidation process, peroxide process, amination process, sulfonation process, polymerization process, alkylation process, and chemical automation control instrument installation, maintenance, and servicing). Personnel engaged in the above operations must undergo training and assessment to obtain a special operation operation certificate. Those without certificates should be included as major accident hazards.

The main purpose of this clause is to require relevant units to set external safety protection distances as buffer zones according to laws and standards to prevent major casualties and property losses caused by fire, explosion, or toxic gas leakage accidents in hazardous chemical production devices and storage facilities. External safety protection distance is neither a fire prevention distance nor a sanitary protection distance, and should be scientifically defined based on hazardous chemical types, quantities, and individual and social acceptable risk standards.

"Implementation Measures for Safety Production Permits of Hazardous Chemical Production Enterprises" (Order No. 41 of the State Administration of Work Safety) require that "automation control systems shall be installed on devices involving hazardous chemical processes and key regulated hazardous chemical devices; emergency shutdown systems shall be installed on large chemical devices involving hazardous chemical processes." In recent years, enterprises involving key regulated hazardous chemical processes have reduced the number of operators in high-risk areas such as device zones by adopting automation control systems and emergency shutdown systems, improving the intrinsic safety level of production devices. However, some enterprises involving key regulated hazardous chemical processes have not implemented automation control and emergency shutdown functions as required, or have installed such systems but do not use them properly. On December 9, 2017, an explosion accident occurred at the 1,2-dichlorobenzene production device of Lianyungang Juxin Biotechnology Co., Ltd. in Jiangsu Province, causing the complete collapse of workshop 4 and adjacent workshop 6, resulting in 10 deaths and 1 injury. The low level of automation control of the accident device and the large number of on-site operators were important reasons for the major casualties.

"Interim Provisions on Supervision and Management of Major Hazard Sources of Hazardous Chemicals" (Order No. 40 of the State Administration of Work Safety) require that require "Level 1 or Level 2 major hazard sources to be equipped with emergency shutdown systems" and "Level 1 or Level 2 major hazard sources involving toxic gases, liquefied gases, or highly toxic liquids to be equipped with independent safety instrumented systems." Hazardous chemical tank areas constituting Level 1 or Level 2 major hazard sources must have emergency shutdown systems on all storage tanks to achieve emergency cut-off functions due to the severe consequences of accidents. For storage tanks directly connected to upstream production devices, if emergency cut-off may cause abnormal conditions such as overpressure in the production device, emergency switching can be set to avoid consequences such as over-liquid level or overpressure caused by the storage tank, achieving emergency cut-off functions. On July 16, 2010, an explosion occurred on the crude oil pipeline of Dalian PetroChina International Storage and Transportation Company, causing a large fire and massive crude oil leakage, resulting in 1 death, 1 injury, and direct economic losses of 223.3019 million yuan. An important reason for the escalation of this accident was The crude oil storage tank where the leak occurred was not equipped with an emergency shut-off system, causing crude oil to continuously flow out from the tank without emergency cut-off, leading to the expansion of the fire. On January 7, 2010, a fire and explosion accident occurred in tank area 316 of the synthetic rubber plant at Lanzhou Petrochemical Company, resulting in 6 deaths, 1 serious injury, and 5 minor injuries. Due to the vaporization and diffusion of C4 material leakage inside the fire containment dike, personnel could not approach to close the bottom valve, and the accident tank was not equipped with an emergency shut-off system, resulting in a large amount of material leakage.

When a full-pressure tank leaks, injecting water into the tank to raise the liquefied hydrocarbon liquid level and submerge the leak point can reduce or prevent liquefied hydrocarbon leakage, eliminating the accident at its inception. On March 5, 1998, a liquefied gas storage tank at the Xi'an Gas Company liquefied gas management office leaked and caught fire, then exploded, causing 12 deaths. The main cause was the failure of the flange seal on the upper part of the 400m³ spherical tank's drainage valve, and the failure to stop the leak led to fire and explosion. "Fire Protection Design Code for Petrochemical Enterprises" (GB50160-2008) Clause 6.3.16 requires, "Full-pressure tanks shall adopt water injection measures to prevent liquefied hydrocarbon leakage." "Safety Design Code for Spherical Liquefied Hydrocarbon Tanks" (SH3136-2003) Clause 7.4 requires, "Spherical tanks for propylene, propane, mixed C4, raffinate C4, and liquefied petroleum gas shall be equipped with water injection facilities."

The installation of water injection measures for full-pressure liquefied hydrocarbon tanks shall undergo formal design, construction, and acceptance procedures. The design of water injection measures should be based on principles of safety, speed, effectiveness, and strong operability, with remote control valves featuring manual functions, complying with relevant national standards. The liquefied hydrocarbon tanks required to be equipped with water injection facilities are mainly full-pressure liquefied hydrocarbon tanks at normal temperature. Water injection measures may not be required for semi-refrigerated pressure liquefied hydrocarbon tanks (such as ethylene) or tanks containing liquefied hydrocarbons that react with water (such as chloromethane). In addition, the installed water injection measures should ensure sufficient water supply to meet emergency injection requirements and fully utilize the function of the water injection system.

Liquefied hydrocarbons, liquid ammonia, liquid chlorine, and other flammable, explosive, toxic, and hazardous liquefied gases have high safety risks during filling; once leaked, they can easily cause explosions, fires, and personnel poisoning. Universal pipeline filling system Flexible rotation, high sealing reliability, low static electricity hazard, long service life, Safety performance far exceeds that of metal hoses, and is easy to operate, effectively reducing the safety risks of filling flammable, explosive, toxic, and hazardous liquefied gases such as liquefied hydrocarbons, liquid ammonia, and liquid chlorine. Safety risks during the filling stage.

Office of the State Council Safety Committee "Guiding Opinions on Further Strengthening the Safety Production of Hazardous Chemicals" (Safety Committee Office [2008] No. 26) and the State Administration of Work Safety and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology "Implementation Opinions on Hazardous Chemical Enterprises' Implementation of the State Council's Notice on Further Strengthening Enterprise Safety Production Work" (Safety Supervision General Office Three [2010] No. 186) both require, that in the filling stage of hazardous chemicals, the use of metal universal pipeline filling systems should be promoted to replace filling hoses, and the use of hoses for filling liquefied chlorine, liquid ammonia, liquefied petroleum gas, liquefied natural gas, and other liquefied hazardous chemicals is prohibited. "Fire Protection Design Code for Petrochemical Enterprises" (GB50160-2008) The requirements for loading and unloading liquefied hydrocarbons and flammable liquids are relatively high. Clause 6.4.2, paragraph six, mandates "Loading and unloading vehicles for Class B, Class A, and Class A flammable liquids shall use submerged loading and unloading arms." Clause 6.4.3 stipulates "1. On-site discharge of liquefied hydrocarbons (i.e., Class A flammable liquids) is strictly prohibited; 2. Low-temperature liquefied hydrocarbon loading and unloading positions shall be set separately." On September 18, 2015, a synthetic ammonia leak accident occurred at Henan Zhonghong Coal Chemical Company, causing poisoning to some villagers near the plant. The cause of the accident was the rupture of a metal hose at the bottom of the synthetic ammonia tower in the chemical plant area of Zhonghong Coal Chemical Company, leading to ammonia gas leakage.

The "Safety Management Regulations for Hazardous Chemical Transportation Pipelines" (Order No. 43 of the State Administration of Work Safety) requires, that pipelines carrying highly toxic chemicals such as phosgene and chlorine are prohibited from passing through (crossing) public areas, and the passage (crossing) of pipelines carrying other toxic gases such as ammonia and hydrogen sulfide through public areas is strictly controlled.

With the rapid development of China's economy and the accelerating urbanization process, some hazardous chemical transportation pipelines originally located in remote suburban areas have gradually been surrounded by newly built residential and commercial areas. Once a toxic gas pipeline passing through a public area leaks, it poses a great threat to the lives and safety of surrounding residents. At the same time, chlorine, phosgene, and hydrogen sulfide all have densities greater than air, are highly corrosive, can corrode equipment, and easily cause equipment and pipeline corrosion failure. Once leaked, it can easily trigger serious accidents. For example, the "4·16" chlorine leak and explosion accident at Tianyuan Chemical Plant in Chongqing in 2004 was caused by long-term corrosion and perforation of equipment, resulting in the explosion of a liquid chlorine storage tank, chlorine gas leakage, and continuous explosions during accident handling, causing 9 deaths, 3 injuries, and the emergency evacuation of 150,000 people.

The voltage level of regional overhead power lines is generally above 35KV. If they pass through production areas, accidents such as pole collapse, wire breakage, or conductor arcing may affect production and cause fires resulting in casualties and property damage. Conversely, if a fire or explosion occurs within the production plant area, it also poses a threat to the overhead power lines. The national standards involved in this clause refer to "Petrochemical Design Fire Protection Code" (GB50160-2008) and "Fire Protection Code for Building Facilities" (GB50016-2014) Among them, Article 4.1.6 of the "Petrochemical Design Fire Protection Code" requires, "Regional overhead power lines are strictly prohibited from passing through production areas." Therefore, petrochemical enterprises and other chemical and hazardous chemical production and operation units designed according to the "Petrochemical Design Fire Protection Code" are strictly prohibited from having regional overhead power lines pass through their production and storage areas. Other chemical and hazardous chemical production and operation units should comply with the provisions of Article 10.2.1 of the "Fire Protection Code for Building Facilities" (GB50016-2014) Article 10.2.1 states, "The minimum horizontal distance between overhead power lines and Class A and B plants (warehouses), combustible material stacks, Class A, B, and C liquid storage tanks, liquefied petroleum gas storage tanks, and combustible and oxidizing gas storage tanks shall comply with the provisions of Table 10.2.1. The minimum horizontal distance between overhead power lines of 35kV and above and single tanks with a volume greater than 200m3 or liquefied petroleum gas storage tank areas with a total volume greater than 1000m3 shall not be less than 40m."

The main purpose of this clause is to control the safety risks of chemical and hazardous chemical production and operation units from the source, meet safety production conditions, and improve the intrinsic safety level of in-service chemical installations. Some early chemical installations in certain regions were built without formal design or were not designed by qualified design units, resulting in planning, layout, process, equipment, and automation control that do not meet safety requirements, with unknown or significant safety risks.

In June 2012, the State Administration of Work Safety, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, and the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development jointly issued the "Notice on Carrying out Special Actions to Improve the Intrinsic Safety Level in the Field of Hazardous Chemicals" (Anjian Zongguan San [2012] No. 87) require that to conduct safety design diagnostics on in-service chemical installations without formal design and comprehensively eliminate safety design hazards. In June 2013, the State Administration of Work Safety and the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development jointly issued the "Notice on Further Strengthening Safety Design Management of Hazardous Chemical Construction Projects" (Anjian Zongguan San [2013] No. 76) which clearly requires, "The design units of (hazardous chemical) construction projects must obtain the relevant engineering design qualifications for chemical, petrochemical, pharmaceutical, petroleum, and natural gas (offshore petroleum) industries as stipulated in the original Ministry of Construction's 'Engineering Design Qualification Standards' (Jianshi [2007] No. 86); for large construction projects involving key regulated hazardous chemical processes, key regulated hazardous chemicals, and major hazardous sources of hazardous chemicals, the design unit's qualification should be comprehensive engineering design qualification or corresponding Grade A professional qualifications in chemical, petrochemical, pharmaceutical, petroleum, and natural gas (offshore petroleum) industries." New, modified, or expanded hazardous chemical construction projects must be designed by design units with corresponding qualifications and relevant design experience. Safety design diagnostics for in-service chemical installations should also be carried out according to corresponding requirements. For example, in 2012, the major explosion accident at Keer Chemical Co., Ltd. in Zhaoxian County, Hebei Province on February 28 involved a company without formal design, with obvious defects in installation layout, process technology and flow, equipment piping, safety facilities, and automation control.

Article 35 of the "Work Safety Law" stipulates, "The state implements a phase-out system for processes and equipment that seriously endanger production safety. The specific catalog is formulated and published by the State Council's safety production supervision department in conjunction with relevant departments of the State Council. If laws and administrative regulations have other provisions on the formulation of the catalog, those provisions shall apply. People's governments of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government may formulate and publish specific catalogs based on local actual conditions to phase out processes and equipment that endanger production safety beyond the provisions of the preceding paragraph. Production and operation units shall not use processes and equipment that should be phased out due to endangering production safety." Therefore, the "catalog of outdated safety technology processes and equipment to be phased out" in this clause refers to the processes and equipment listed in the State Administration of Work Safety's "Notice on Issuing the Catalog of Outdated Safety Technology Equipment to be Phased Out (First Batch of 2015)" (Anjian Zongting Keji [2015] No. 43), "Notice on Issuing the Catalog of Outdated Safety Technology Processes and Equipment to be Phased Out (2016)" (Anjian Zong Keji [2016] No. 137), and other related documents, which have been phased out, and each region may also formulate and publish specific catalogs on its own. For example, the Shanxi Jincheng "5·16" accident involved a company using the nationally banned outdated process—indirect coke method for producing carbon disulfide. This process is prone to leaks, poisoning, and other production safety accidents, with prominent safety hazards.

The national standards specified in this clause refer to "Design Code for Detection and Alarm of Combustible and Toxic Gases in Petrochemical Industry" (GB50493-2009), "Explosive Atmospheres Part 1: Equipment General Requirements" (GB3836.1-2010), and "Electrical Apparatus for Explosive Gas Atmospheres Part 16: Inspection and Maintenance of Electrical Installations (Excluding Coal Mines)" (GB3836.16-2006). Among them, the "Design Code for Detection and Alarm of Combustible and Toxic Gases in Petrochemical Industry" requires, chemical and hazardous chemical enterprises to install detection and alarm devices in areas involving combustible and toxic gas leaks according to the above regulations and standards. The installation content includes detection and alarm categories, the number and location of devices, detection and alarm thresholds, remote information transmission, continuous recording and storage requirements, audible and visual alarm requirements, and the integrity of detection and alarm devices; "Explosive Atmospheres Part 1: Equipment General Requirements" (GB3836.1-2010) and "Electrical Apparatus for Explosive Gas Atmospheres Part 16: Inspection and Maintenance of Electrical Installations (Excluding Coal Mines)" (GB3836.16-2006) clearly define the classification of explosion-proof areas and set clear requirements for the selection, installation, and use of electrical equipment in explosion-proof areas. On August 26, 2008, an acetylene gas leak and explosion occurred at the organic plant of Guangxi Guangwei Chemical Co., Ltd., resulting in 21 deaths and more than 60 injuries. One cause of the accident was that the tank area was not equipped with combustible gas alarms, and the material leak was not detected in time. On June 5, 2017, a liquefied gas tanker truck of Shandong Linyi Jinyu Petrochemical Company leaked liquefied gas during unloading, causing a major explosion and fire accident. Analysis suggests that the possible ignition source for the first explosion was an electric spark generated by non-explosion-proof electrical equipment in use in the production duty room of Linyi Jinyu Petrochemical Co., Ltd.

The main purpose of this clause is Enterprises are required to implement fire and explosion protection safety requirements for important facilities such as control rooms and cabinet rooms, so that in the event of fire or explosion accidents, the life safety of personnel working inside the control room and the safety of important automatic control systems and equipment facilities within the control room and cabinet rooms can be effectively protected. The involved national standards include "Petrochemical Design Fire Protection Code" (GB50160-2008) and "Building Facility Fire Protection Code" (GB50016-2014). Control rooms or cabinet rooms of chemical and hazardous chemical enterprises with fire and explosion hazards shall meet the following requirements:

The "5·11" explosion accident at Dahua in Cangzhou, Hebei in 2007 and the "6·5" explosion accident in Linyi, Shandong in 2017 both exposed the problem that control rooms did not meet fire and explosion protection requirements.

The main purpose of this clause is From a hardware perspective, safety of important loads and control systems of chemical production units is improved by setting dual power supplies for chemical production units and uninterruptible power supplies for automation control systems. The involved standards mainly include "Power Supply and Distribution System Design Code" (GB50052-2009) and "Technical Code for Electrical Design of Petrochemical Enterprise Production Units" (SH3038-2000). For example, on February 21, 2017, an explosion accident occurred in the reaction kettle of the p-nitroaniline workshop at Lixin Chemical Company in Alxa League, Inner Mongolia, causing 2 deaths and 4 injuries. According to the investigation, the accident enterprise resumed production without complete emergency power supply. Due to heavy snow causing a total power outage in the industrial park, the enterprise's emergency power supply was unavailable, resulting in the inability to cool the reaction kettle in the p-nitroaniline workshop, leading to the explosion.

On July 16, 2016, a fire and explosion accident occurred at the liquefied hydrocarbon storage tank of Shandong Shida Technology Petrochemical Co., Ltd. in Rizhao City, Shandong Province, according to the accident investigation report, the manual valves before and after the tank top safety valve were closed, the gas vent line main pipe was isolated by a blind plate at the boundary of the liquefied hydrocarbon tank area, making it impossible to safely release liquefied petroleum gas through the flare system, and important safety measures could not be used normally, which was the main reason for the expansion of the accident consequences. This clause ensures the integrity of enterprise safety facilities by regulating the management of safety accessories such as safety valves and rupture discs with pressure relief and discharge functions.

"Fire Protection Design Code for Petrochemical Enterprises" (GB50160-2008) Section 5.5 "Pressure Relief Discharge and Flare System" puts forward clear requirements for the design, installation, and setting of safety accessories such as safety valves and rupture discs with pressure relief and discharge functions in chemical and hazardous chemical enterprises. Safety accessories such as safety valves and rupture discs belong to safety pressure relief devices of pressure vessels and are important accessories to ensure the safe use of pressure vessels. Their reasonable setting, performance quality, and integrity directly relate to the safety of production, storage equipment, and personnel in chemical and hazardous chemical enterprises.

The safety production responsibility system is the most basic safety system in enterprises and the core of enterprise safety production management systems. After accidents, investigations into enterprise management causes often relate to incomplete responsibility systems and inadequate hidden danger investigation and management. The main purpose of this clause is to urge chemical and hazardous chemical enterprises to formulate and implement a comprehensive safety production responsibility system matching job responsibilities, establish hidden danger investigation and management systems based on the unit's production and operation characteristics, risk distribution, types and severity of hazardous factors, and promote the establishment of long-term safety production mechanisms. Regarding the enterprise safety production responsibility system, two main points are checked: first, all enterprise positions should establish corresponding safety production responsibilities, and the content of the responsibility system should include but not be limited to basic statutory duties; second, appropriate methods should be used to inform employees of safety production responsibilities and assessment results. Hidden danger investigation and management should be normalized, achieve closed-loop management, and be included in daily assessments.

Article 18 of the "Work Safety Law" stipulates, "The main person in charge of the production and operation unit shall be responsible for organizing the formulation of the unit's safety production rules and operating procedures." Each production position in chemical and hazardous chemical enterprises should formulate operating procedures and process control indicators: first, formulate operating procedure management systems, standardize the content of operating procedures, and clarify the procedures and responsibilities for writing, reviewing, approving, distributing, using, controlling, modifying, and abolishing operating procedures. second, The content of operating procedures for each production position should at least include operation steps and safety requirements for startup, normal operation, temporary operation, emergency operation, normal shutdown, and emergency shutdown; normal control ranges of process parameters, consequences of deviation from normal conditions, methods and steps to prevent and correct deviations; personal safety protection and occupational health considerations during operation. Third, Formulate process control indicators, such as clearly specifying the minimum requirements for process and equipment safe operation in the form of process cards. Fourth, Operating procedures and process control indicators should be scientific and reasonable to ensure the safety of the production process.

Chemical and hazardous chemical enterprises that have not formulated operating procedures and process control indicators, or whose formulated operating procedures and process control indicators do not meet any of the above four requirements, should be included in the management of major accident hazards. Such as the "2·28" major explosion accident in Zhaoxian, Hebei Province, exposed The accident enterprise had chaotic process management, arbitrarily changed production raw materials and process facilities without safety review, workshop management personnel lacked professional knowledge and ability, violated operating procedures, and arbitrarily raised the reaction temperature significantly.

In recent years, accidents in special operations such as hot work and confined space entry in chemical and hazardous chemical production and operation units account for nearly 50% of all accidents. On April 22, 2016, a fire occurred at the No. 2 exchange station in the tank area of Jiangsu Jingjiang Deqiao Storage Co., Ltd., causing a direct economic loss of 25.3214 million yuan. The investigation found that the direct cause of the accident was Deqiao Company organized contractors to perform hot work on the pipelines at the No. 2 exchange station. Without cleaning the oil in the trench at the work site, without combustible gas analysis, and without isolating the trench below the hot work point by covering or spreading sand, they violated regulations and performed hot work. Sparks generated during cutting ignited combustible materials in the trench, causing a major fire.

The main purpose of this clause is to promote the safe conduct of hot work, confined space entry, and other special operations that may be involved during equipment maintenance and related operations in chemical production and operation units. The involved national standard refers to "Safety Specifications for Special Operations in Chemical Production Units" (GB30871-2014).

The safety risks of new processes are unknown. Without safety and reliability demonstration, stepwise scale-up tests, and rigorous trial production plans, risks are difficult to identify, control measures are hard to implement, and "unforeseen" accidents are prone to occur. In this clause, "Fine chemical enterprises have not conducted reaction safety risk assessments according to normative documents," The normative document refers to the "Guiding Opinions on Strengthening Reaction Safety Risk Assessment Work in Fine Chemicals" issued by the State Administration of Work Safety in January 2017, (Anjian Zongguan San [2017] No. 1) require that Enterprises involving key regulated hazardous chemical processes and metal-organic synthesis reactions (including Grignard reactions) in batch and semi-batch reactions, If any of the following situations occur, a reaction safety risk assessment must be conducted:

Reaction runaway in fine chemical production is an important cause of accidents. Conducting reaction safety risk assessments, determining risk levels, and taking effective control measures are of great significance for ensuring enterprise safety production. The "6·9" deflagration accident at Zhejiang Linjiang Chemical Co., Ltd. in 2017 was caused by the enterprise driven by economic interests conducting pilot research and development of pharmaceutical intermediates in a shut-down workshop without understanding reaction safety risks. They blindly scaled up the experiment more than 10,000 times based only on a 500ml small-scale test. Due to the instability of intermediate products, decomposition occurred, causing a deflagration accident.

Mixing and storing incompatible substances together poses great safety risks. The main purpose of this clause is to address prominent issues such as mixed storage and stacking of hazardous chemicals and excessive quantity and variety storage in hazardous chemical storage sites, to curb major and particularly serious accidents. The involved national standards mainly include "Code for Fire Protection Design of Buildings" (GB50016-2014), "General Rules for Storage of Common Hazardous Chemicals" (GB15603-1995), "Technical Conditions for Storage and Maintenance of Flammable and Explosive Commodities" (GB17914-2013), "Technical Conditions for Storage and Maintenance of Corrosive Commodities" (GB17915-2013), and "Technical Conditions for Storage and Maintenance of Toxic Commodities" (GB17916-2013). On August 12, 2015, a particularly major fire and explosion accident occurred at Ruihai International Logistics Co., Ltd. located in Tianjin Port, Binhai New Area, Tianjin, The prominent problem exposed by the accident was Different hazardous chemicals with different hazard characteristics were mixed and stored together, greatly amplifying the consequences of the accident. The accident caused 165 deaths, 8 missing persons, 798 injuries, and significant economic losses.